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PRIDE AND PREJUDICE: A STUDY OF CONNECTIONS
Mary Louise Fellows*
INTRODUCTION
Although customs surrounding attribution require that only I
be named as author of this Article, that fact obscures other truths
about this Article.1 One way for readers to appreciate this Article
as reflecting group activity at the same time it reflects my own in-
dividual effort is the literary allusion in the title to Jane Austen and
her work. I feel a particular connection to Jane Austen because she
seems neither to have enjoyed nor sought the solitary life many of
us imagine novelists live. When Austen finds herself, after ten
years of having written virtually nothing, back in a permanent
home with her sister and widowed mother at Chawton she enjoys
exceptional literary success. 2 She sees finally the publication of
Sense and Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice, and she writes
Mansfield Park, Emma, and Persuasion.3 The evidence of solitary
hours in her newly acquired cottage is scarce while the evidence of
familial connectedness is substantial. She continued to share a
bedroom with her sister Cassandra, and she apparently worked
* Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Portions of this Article are
drawn from Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Em-
pirical Study, 16 Law & Ineq. 1 (1998).
I am reminded of a passage found in one of Virginia Woolf s notebooks where she
explores biography: "The biographer cannot extract the atom. He gives us the husk.
Therefore as things are, the best method would be to separate the two kinds of truth. Let
the biographer print fully, completely, accurately, the known facts without comment;
Then let him write the life as fiction." Notebooks, Monk's House Papers, University of
Sussex Library Manuscript Collections, quoted in Hermione Lee, Virginia Woolf 10
(1996). One of my purposes is to find a way for the reader to look beyond the "husk" and
appreciate the underlying connections among individuals reflected in the making of and
the subject of this Article. For a further discussion of the quoted passage and Woolf s
consideration of biography, see Hermione Lee's excellent chapter on biography in Lee,
supra, at 3-20.
2 See Claire Tomalin, Jane Austen: A Life 208 (1997).
3 See Dierdre Le Faye, Chronology of Jane Austen's Life, in The Cambridge Compan-
ion to Jane Austen 1, 8-11 (Edward Copeland & Juliet McMaster eds., 1997).
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right in the thick of the household clamor on the first floor of the
house between the front door and some offices. 4 In the recently
published biography on Austen, Claire Tomalin found it necessary
after telling us these facts to add "[w]e find it surprising that Jane
did not want to be alone, claiming the privacy that seems appro-
priate to a writer... .-5 Rather than being surprised, I was drawn
to Austen because she did not want or need to be secluded. For me
Jane Austen is representative of writers who have as much need
for connection as they do for solitude, and they establish life
rhythms that negotiate with relative ease the tension between those
two states of happiness.
One form of connection is working collaboratively, and col-
laboration certainly best describes the scholarly process behind
this Article, which reports the findings of an empirical study on
inheritance. 6 The purpose of the study was to assess public atti-
tudes about including surviving committed partners as heirs-a
study of connections and the legal recognition of them.7 For read-
ers to place my emphasis on collaboration as well as the findings
of the empirical study into further context, I need to describe a
similar study that I published twenty years ago (the 1978 study). 8
The 1978 study assessed public attitudes about how to distribute
the property of a decedent who died without a will among surviv-
ing family members, including a legal spouse, children, parents,
and grandchildren. Both the 1978 and the current study integrated
my scholarship with my teaching: law students were involved in
the design of both studies from the outset. For the current project I
4 See Tomalin, supra note 2, at 210, 216.
5 Id. at 210
6 The complete findings of the empirical study have been previously published. See
Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16
Law & Ineq. 1 (1998).
7 When I use the term committed partner, I am referring to unmarried persons who in
recognition of their affection for each other have decided to share their lives together-
with living together generally involving interrelated financial and living arrangements as
well as sexual intimacy. The definition of a committed partner is contested and raises a
number of theoretical, political, and practical questions. Does it mean partners who co-
habit? Does it mean partners who are sexually intimate? Does it mean partners who are
financially interdependent? These questions and many others were explored in the em-
pirical study.
Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death




went to the Board of Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and
Practice in 1995 and asked them if students on the Board would
be interested in participating in an empirical study on inheritance
law and committed couples that could then be published in the
journal. Five students enthusiastically volunteered-brainstorming
sessions, summer reading groups, and sessions devoted to drafting
and redrafting of the survey instruments followed. Both projects
also integrated my commitment to interdisciplinary work and
building relationships with people outside the law: sociologists
were initially interested by the legal questions we were asking and
ultimately became intrigued by the possibility of using their exper-
tise to create knowledge that could lead to law reform.9
Perhaps a less obvious connection between the two projects is
Robert Stein, the former Dean of the University of Minnesota Law
School. This connection requires a little more explanation but is
no less important to placing the themes of this Article into context.
As a young associate professor looking for funding to conduct an
empirical study, I traveled to the American Bar Foundation to talk
with Bob, who was at that time involved in research sponsored by
the Foundation. I requested the meeting to explain why a tele-
phone survey could prove useful to legislatures considering heir-
ship rights. At that time, the notion of learning about heirship by
talking to living persons rather than looking at wills and the estates
of dead persons was a new idea. Bob was immediately enthusiastic
about the methodology and played an important role in assuring
the Bar Foundation's funding.
Twenty years later, I sought funding for the current empirical
study from the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel's
Foundation, which has as its mission the support of research in the
area of inheritance law. The funding request described a study that
would consider both same-sex and opposite-sex committed cou-
ples, recognizing that heirship for the two categories of couples
9 In the 1978 study, Professor Rita J. Simon, who at that time was director of the Law
and Society Program at the University of Illinois and Professor of Sociology, Law and
Communications Research, was a co-investigator. William Rau, who at that time was a
law student and a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology, was also a co-author of the study. In the
current study, Monica Johnson, a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology at the University of Min-
nesota, joined our research group early on and provided invaluable expertise throughout
the planning of the survey and the analysis of the findings.
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raises different issues with different implications. The idea to do
this empirical study arose out of a proposal made by Lawrence W.
Waggoner, a preeminent scholar on trusts and estates and national
leader on probate reform.' 0 The proposal had not been well re-
ceived, in part because of a lack of information about who are
committed couples and how they want to share their estates. The
methodology was no longer in dispute-the Counsel along with
the American Bar Association and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had embraced the 1978
study and incorporated the findings into the Uniform Probate
Code. This time the controversy concerned the questions we were
asking. This time the funding was denied. The letter telling us to
look elsewhere for funding said in part:
After very careful and fairly lengthy deliberations,
it was concluded that the Foundation would not
fund the grant requested.
There was concern expressed with respect to
the need for the survey referred to in your Grant
Application and whether the survey described and
the constituency proposed to be surveyed was
broad enough, as well as the overall cost of the sur-
vey.
Although it is not necessary for the Foundation
to provide an applicant with any reason as to why a
Grant Application is turned down, in fairness, I
thought it appropriate to provide you with the fore-
going explanation." l
10 In 1995 Professor Waggoner made a tentative statutory proposal. See Fellows et al.,
supra note 6, at 92 (providing the complete draft of the proposal). Professor Waggoner is
currently the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Other Donative
Transfers). He is also the Director of Research of the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform
Trust and Estate Acts, which is a supervisory body that monitors the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC). He was the Chief Reporter of the revisions to Article II of the UPC, which
were promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) in 1990.
1 Letter from Thomas P. Sweeney, President of the American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel Foundation, to Mary Louise Fellows (Oct. 18, 1995) (emphasis added)
(on file with the Virginia Journl of Social Policy & the Law).
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This letter reveals the Foundation's anxiety regarding the pro-
ject. A request to fund a study of the lives of unmarried couples,
particularly same-sex couples, unanchored the Foundation's Board
members from their secure position that being committed to im-
proving the law of inheritance for the citizenry meant maintaining
comfortable social conventions.The way they resolved the chal-
lenge to their purpose and self-image was to convince themselves
that it would be inappropriate to invest money to learn more about
a negligible and unimportant sector of the citizenry. I should also
mention that I was encouraged to apply to the Minnesota State Bar
Association for funding of a smaller project that would limit the
survey to Minnesotans. Before things progressed to the stage of a
formal application, it became clear that the Bar had little interest,
and I was advised not to apply.
As I fretted about funding sources, I received a very welcome
call from Rossana Armson of the Minnesota Center for Survey
Research. She and her staff had been advising us regarding our
survey instrument for over a year. After she had learned of our
funding problems, her enthusiasm for the project led her to seek
permission for us to be the Center's "pro bono" project for the
year. We would only be required to pay the variable costs of con-
ducting the telephone survey. It meant that we would have to limit
the number of respondents in the survey and conduct the survey
only in Minnesota, but at least we could test the study design and
get some preliminary findings. That brought me to the dean's of-
fice. I explained the project, my obligation to the students, and the
funding issues, and Dean E. Thomas Sullivan without hesitating
saw the value of the project and the importance of supporting in-
terdisciplinary research in collaboration with students. He agreed
to advance me research funds so that we could go forward with the
study.
The relevance of our work became clear when, on July 1,
1997, same-sex couples who reside in Hawaii were given the right
to register as "reciprocal beneficiaries." 12 As reciprocal beneficiar-
ies, they had the right to enjoy many of the benefits of marriage,
including the right to inherit. This legislation was a reaction to the
12 Act Relating to Unmarried Couples (Reciprocal Beneficiaries), 1997 Haw. Sess.
Laws, Act 383 (codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 572C-1-7 (Michie 1999)).
4592000]
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widely publicized Hawaii Supreme Court case that found that the
state's prohibition of same-sex marriage violated the Constitution
of the State of Hawaii. 13 Through much political wrangling, the
legislature reached a compromise by passing the Act Relating to
Unmarred Couples (the "Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act"), while
also passing legislation for a constitutional amendment which re-
stricts marriage to opposite-sex couples. 14 The legal reality of in-
heritance rights for committed couples reinforced our research
group's conviction that our work could prove valuable in affecting
the direction of future law reform.
The story about the funding of our empirical study had a happy
ending but a very troubling beginning. Traditional funding sources
were not available for this study because it concerned nontradi-
tional couples, most especially it concerned same-sex couples.
This is just one example of what it means to create a life contrary
to the social conventions of the day; it means that you are at risk of
being deemed unworthy of that society's concern and that an indi-
cia of citizenship rights, such as heirship, may be denied to you.
13 In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 65-69 (Haw. 1993), the Hawaii Supreme Court
found that the state was denying same-sex couples the right to marry based on the sex of
the applicants. In accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitu-
tion (Haw. Const. art I, § 5), the court held that the state was required to demonstrate a
compelling state interest why same-sex couples should be denied the right to marry. It
remanded the case for trial to hear evidence on that issue. The trial court ruled in late
1996 that the state had failed to meet its burden of showing that prohibiting same-sex
couples from marrying was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See Baehr v.
Miike, No. Civ. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The court
granted the state's motion to stay the ruling pending an appeal to the Hawaii Supreme
Court. See id. at *21. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the constitutional amend-
ment, see infra note 14, had made the case moot. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999
Haw. LEXIS 391 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
14 A Bill for an Act Proposing a Constitutional Amendment Relating to Marriage,
H.B. 117, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997). The Hawaii electorate approved the pro-
posed constitutional amendment in November 1998. See Haw. Const. art I, § 23.
Vermont also has enacted legislation recognizing same-sex couples. In response to
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), which held that exclusion of same-sex cou-
ples from the benefits and protections enjoyed by married couples under state law vio-
lated the Common Benefits Clause of the state constitution, the Vermont legislature cre-
ated the legal concept of civil unions to enable same-sex couples to obtain the same
benefits that married couples enjoy. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1204 (LEXIS
Supp. 2000).
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I know of no better way of conveying to the reader the impli-
cations of resisting social conventions, as well as the implications
of asking the question whether committed partners should be
treated as heirs, than to remind the reader of the lessons to be
found in Jane Austen's novel Pride and Prejudice. 15 Now many
readers may find it quite curious, and perhaps even absurd, that for
an article concerning unmarried couples, and especially same-sex
couples, I would rely on this Austen novel. After all, Pride and
Prejudice could be described succinctly and accurately as a novel
having to do with courtship and marriage. Notwithstanding all the
reasons not to proceed, I am going to ask readers to put aside their
skepticism while I give my reasons for thinking Pride and Preju-
dice has so much to tell us about living unconventional lives and
about the findings of the survey itself.16
First, let me briefly describe the novel. Written about 1797, but
published anonymously in 1813, Pride and Prejudice introduces
us to the Bennet family: five young daughters; a disengaged and
irresponsible father; and a mother concerned only about dresses, a
respectable dinner table, and marriages for all of her daughters. 17
We learn early in the novel that in Regency England the marriage
prospects for the Bennet daughters are not very good because they
each will have little more than £1,000, and that only after their
mother dies. 18 The estate they live on is entailed, and in the ab-
sence of a male heir, is destined to pass at Mr. Bennet's death to
Mr. Collins, his cousin. 19 Nevertheless, hope runs eternal in the
heart of Mrs. Bennet to see her daughters married well. Excite-
ment in the neighborhood and in the Bennet household is palpable
when news comes that a wealthy and eligible man, Mr. Bingley,
has just purchased one of the neighborhood's finest estates and
that he is accompanied by a friend, Mr. Darcy, the head of a highly
15 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (Tony Tanner ed., Penguin Books 1972) (1813).
16 For further discussion of the implications of Austen's work to issues of sexuality,
see generally, e.g., Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Tendencies 109-29 (1993); Terry Castle,
Sister-Sister, London Rev. Books, Aug. 3, 1995, at 3 (reviewing Jane Austen's Letters
(Deirdre Le Faye ed., 3d. ed. 1995)); Claudia L. Johnson, The Divine Miss Jane: Jane
Austen, Janeites, and the Discipline of Novel Studies, 23 Boundary 2 143 (1996).
17 See Note on the Text, in Austen, supra note 15, at 47.
18 See Austen, supra note 15, at 148.
19 See id. at 106-07.
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regarded landed family. 20 Through the benefit of assemblies, balls,
dinners, and evening entertainments, Mr. Bingley has the opportu-
nity to fall in love with the sensitive, generous, and sincere Jane,
the Bennets' oldest daughter. His friend Mr. Fitzwilliam Darcy,
against his economic and social interest and against his highly
sharpened sense of propriety, finds himself falling in love with
Elizabeth, the Bennets' second oldest daughter.21 As the novel re-
veals conversations, events, letters, and Elizabeth's reflections on
all of the above, the reader learns about the routines and rituals of
a small section of society. It is no surprise to the reader, even if it
is to Jane and Elizabeth Bennet, that the novel ends in both daugh-
ters finding themselves in highly satisfactory marriages. Reflective
readers are surprised to find that, thanks to Austen's expertise as a
dramatist as well as a narrator, the portrayal of this section of soci-
ety, brings them to a clearer understanding of the shifting nature of
truth, ideas, and judgments of a society and of the individuals
within it. And even more importantly, they come to learn along
with Elizabeth Bennet, that, to paraphrase a passage from Tony
Tanner's excellent critique of the novel, once we, like Elizabeth,
"perceiv[e] [our] own pride and prejudice ... [we] can ... begin
to be free of them."'22
The most obvious clue that Austen's novel could be helpful in
thinking about the question of heirship for unmarried couples is its
title. The title was a commonplace phrase in the literature of Aus-
ten's day and she probably replaced its first title, First Impres-
sions,23 to signal a number of literary allusions found in the
book.24 Taking a more literal rather than a literary view of the title,
I want to consider the different hues of the meaning of the word
"pride" both in terms of the way Austen used it two hundred years
ago and the way we use it today. Austen uses the term "pride"
20 See id. at 51-52, 58.
21 I adopt Austen's convention of naming by referring to Elizabeth Bennet by her
given name and Fitzwilliam Darcy by his surname. For further discussion of naming, see
Susan Kneedler, The New Romance in Pride and Prejudice, in Approaches to Teaching
Austen's Pride and Prejudice 152, 164 n.2 (Marcia McClintock Folsom ed., 1993) [here-
inafter Approaches].
22 Tony Tanner, Introduction to Austen, supra note 15, at 7, 16.
23 See Kenneth L. Moler, Literary Allusion in Pride and Prejudice, in Approaches,
supra note 21, at 89, 89; Note on the Text, supra note 17, at 47.
24 See Moler, supra note 23, at 89.
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pejoratively to describe Mr. Darcy's manners toward those outside
his own small party of acquaintances. For example, at the first as-
sembly gathering after Bingley joined the neighborhood, Darcy
was received as follows:
The gentlemen pronounced him to be a fine figure
of a man, the ladies declared he was much hand-
somer than Mr. Bingley, and he was looked at with
great admiration for about half the evening, till his
manners gave a disgust which turned the tide of his
popularity; for he was discovered to be proud, to be
above his company, and above being pleased; and
not all his large estate in Derbyshire could then
save him from having a most forbidding, disagree-
able countenance, and being unworthy to be com-
pared with his friend.25
Pride is improper in this context because it is used as a basis for
thinking ill of others. Austen does not, however, dismiss the use-
fulness of pride. She demonstrates in the character of Bingley the
dangers of lacking pride. His inability to appreciate that he was in
a superior position to judge allowed him to be persuaded by Darcy
that Jane did not love him.26 It is this proper pride described in the
novel that comes closest to the political currency the term has at-
tained within the civil rights and liberation movements during the
last half of the 20th century. Pride in this context is a rhetoric con-
veying both self-esteem and identity at the same time that it is a
rejection of social norms and constraints that have the effect of
naturalizing shame and degradation upon certain groups of per-
sons. When used to describe Mr. Darcy, Austen is telling us that
pride leads to ignorance and prejudice based on that ignorance that
can remain in place not because those views are better-reasoned or
better-informed but because social position allows them to remain
untested and undisturbed. Pride within a liberation movement
emanates from group members' daily experiences with the harm-
ful consequences of social norms and it is those experiences that
25 Austen, supra note 15, at 58 (emphasis added).
26 See Elizabeth Langland, A Feminist and Formalist Approach to Close Reading, in
Approaches, supra note 21, at 140, 144-45 (discussing how proper and improper pride
are central paradigms by which a reader can "align and distinguish" the characters in the
novel).
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ultimately lead people to intellectually and emotionally interrogate
those norms.
Pride as a challenge to social norms, in fact, correlates directly
with the novel's central theme of liberation through self-reflection
on one's own prejudice. 27 For Elizabeth Bennet and Mr. Darcy to
come together in marriage at the end of the book, both are required
to unlearn what they know and feel. This is made most vivid when
Austen describes Elizabeth's thinking after she reads Mr. Darcy's
letter that offers an explanation for his actions for which she had
criticized him and cited to him as reasons why they could never
marry. 28 When she first starts to read the letter she is described as
having "a strong prejudice against every thing [it] might say
.... "29 But through reading and rereading and thinking and re-
thinking she comes to a quite different place:
'How despicably have I acted!' she cried.-'I, who
have prided myself on my discemment!-I, who
have valued myself on my abilities! ... How hu-
miliating is this discovery!-Yet, how just a hu-
miliation!-Had I been in love, I could not have
been more wretchedly blind. But vanity, not love,
has been my folly.... I have courted prepossession
and ignorance, and driven reason away .... Till
this moment, I never knew myself.' 30
Mr. Darcy's self-revelation comes from the writing of the let-
ter itself when he is forced to see himself as Elizabeth sees him.
Through the letter writing and its reading, Austen presses us to be-
lieve in each other's ability to break the constraints of prejudice.
She persuades us in Pride and Prejudice to believe that each of us
can break those constraints if we can keep ourselves from "driving
reason away." Austen helps us better understand that it was im-
proper pride and prejudice obscured by social conventions that led
to our funding difficulties and that it was proper pride that gave us
the self-confidence to challenge tradition and continue our work.
27 For further exploration of self-reflection in the novel, see Tanner, supra note 22, at
26-29.
28 Austen, supra note 15, at 227-32.
29 Id. at 233.
30 Id. at 236-37.
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Improper and proper pride also provide a useful framework for
considering the findings of the empirical study.
I. THE LAW OF INHERITANCE
Under prevailing statutory law, a surviving committed partner
does not share in the decedent's estate at death. The property of
the partner who dies passes to that partner's children. 31 If there are
no children, the property passes to that partner's parents or if the
parents are dead to that partner's siblings.32 If the couple had been
married, the surviving partner as legal spouse would inherit all or
nearly all of the decedent's estate regardless of whether the dece-
dent was survived by children, parents, or siblings. 33
One question many readers may be asking with regard to
same-sex couples is why concern ourselves with issues of heir-
ship-why not address the question of the right to marry directly.
One answer to that question is political: marriage for same-sex
couples is not likely to win approval in most state legislatures in
the foreseeable future.34 Another answer is that there are good rea-
sons to view the functions of the heirship laws separate from mar-
riage. The function of heirship laws is to accomplish a decedent's
donative intent in the absence of a will, and they do that in a way
that reflects society's view of fairness and its commitment to pro-
31 If the decedent is survived by grandchildren, great grandchildren, etc., these lineal
descendants would take ahead of ancestors and collaterals. See, e.g., Unif. Probate Code
§ 2-103(1) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 83 (1998) (discussing the share of heirs other than
the surviving spouse).
32 See, e.g., id. § 2-103(2), (3), 8 U.L.A. 83.
33 See, e.g., id. § 2-102 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 81.
34 For example, in a preemptive effort to prevent having to recognize Hawaii same-sex
marriages, a substantial number of states have enacted anti-same-sex marriage bills. See
Hawaii Seeks Law to Block Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1997, at A15 (noting
that as of April 1997, 18 states had enacted laws not to recognize same-sex marriage). In
1996, the federal government also took preemptive action by enacting the Defense of
Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (Supp. IV 1999)). The Act allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex mar-
riages of another state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. It also provides that the term "marriage"
as used in all federal statutes or agency rulings, regulations, or interpretations means
"only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife" and the term
"spouse" means "only a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife." 1 U.S.C. §
7. Same-sex married couples, therefore, would not be treated as married for purposes of
federal taxation, immigration, or other federal programs.
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mote familial-type ties. 35 This study is based on the premise that
heirship laws can accomplish their function if they conform to the
notion of family as it evolves sociologically and not if they are tied
exclusively to a definition of family determined through legally
recognized marriages. Support for this functional view can be de-
rived from the development of the law of inheritance itself.
Over the last few hundred years, the inheritance laws have
continually changed to reflect and support societal changes. In
making the transition from feudalism to liberal democracies, Brit-
ain and Europe began in the eighteenth century to develop new
ideologies. 36 The Enlightenment idea of the rational man uncon-
nected to a bloodline or community was a cornerstone of liberal-
ism and became the basis for eliminating, for example, primogeni-
ture.37 More recently, changes in the 20th century have delinked
bloodline from the definition of family. Specifically, the law has
expanded the inheritance rights of legal spouses and adopted chil-
dren.38 In the last half of the 20th century the law has also ex-
panded the inheritance rights of nonmarital children. 39 This reform
marks the moment that the law made a distinction between moral
beliefs and fairness. 40 These legal changes demonstrate the law's
35 See Lawrence W. Waggoner et al., Family Property Law: Cases and Materials on
Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests 33-34 (2d ed. 1997) (describing what objectives guide
3olicymakers in developing a system of intestate succession).
6 Cf David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning
2-6 (1993) (commenting on how the concept of race has been modified over time).
37 Primogeniture means "[tihe superior or exclusive right possessed by the eldest son,
and particularly, his right to succeed to the estate of his ancestor, in right of his seniority
by birth, to the exclusion of younger sons." Black's Law Dictionary 1191 (6th ed. 1990).
In the United States, rejection of the preference of males over females and of primogeni-
ture among male descendants began during the colonial period. See Stanley N. Katz, Re-
publicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 Mich. L.
Rev. 1, 10-11 (1977). Reform of intestacy laws, including the elimination of primogeni-
ture in virtually all of the states in favor of a rule that treated the children equally, re-
flected the influence of the political tradition of republicanism. See id. at 12-13. The pre-
ambles to the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary acts governing inheritance
expressed the republican abhorrence of aristocracy, family dynasties, and large estates.
See id. at 14-15. For further discussions of the relationship between early American in-
heritance law and republican political ideology, see generally Gregory S. Alexander,
Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 273
t1991); Katz, supra.
8 See, e.g., Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-102, 2-114 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 81-82, 91-
92 (1998).
39 See id. § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 91-92.
40 See generally Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding to be an unconstitu-
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responsiveness to and support of societal changes. This list of
changes carries a message beyond demonstrating the tradition of
continuous change in the definition of heirs. It also suggests that
the law's treatment of spouses, adopted children, and nonmarital
children sets the stage for us to imagine the question of committed
partners as heirs.
Pride and Prejudice provides a useful metaphor for the point
that I am making. The novel is about the routines and social rituals
that dominate the lives of this small section of society, securing its
continuity and minimizing the possibility of anything approaching
transformation. Nevertheless, within those routines and rituals, a
highly unlikely and socially disturbing marriage between Eliza-
beth Bennet and Fitzwilliam Darcy takes place. The marriage of a
woman to a gentleman that crosses economic and social lines
represents dramatic social change at the same time that it evolves
out of the familiar assemblies, balls, dinners, and neighborhood
visits that mark the rhythm of Regency England.4 1 Austen knows
that Elizabeth and Darcy's marriage means changes to the society
in which it takes place.
Arguing that a change to the inheritance law can be defended
independently from marriage because it would serve the primary
functions of the inheritance law is not contending that such a
change would not have implications beyond the fact that it accom-
plishes a transfer of property. At the same time that heirship stat-
utes reflect social norms and values, they also shape the norms and
values by recognizing and legitimating relationships. Here, I think
it is important to distinguish between opposite-sex and same-sex
couples. For opposite-sex couples, the recognition not only may
accomplish donative intent and fairness, but it also carries the po-
tential benefit of validating the relationship and strengthening fam-
ily ties. Along with this potential benefit, however, legal recogni-
tion increases the incentive of couples to assimilate and reproduce
the marriage model that at least some opposite-sex couples have
tional denial of equal protection an inheritance statute allowing a child to inherit from the
child's father only if the father married the child's mother and acknowledged the child).
41 For an excellent discussion of the economic and social realities of Elizabeth and
Darcy's marriage, see Edward Copeland, The Economic Realities of Jane Austen's Day,
in Approaches to Teaching Austen's Pride and Prejudice 33-45 (Marcia McClintock
Folsom ed., 1993) [hereinafter Approaches].
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rejected. In that regard, it presents a double bind-validation is in
tension with the risk of assimilation. For same-sex couples, dona-
tive intent, fairness, and familial ties are also at stake. Beyond that,
however, statutory reform of the inheritance laws would validate a
person's sexual identity. The double bind for same-sex couples is
validation at the cost of reinforcing the heterosexual model. 42
There is no escaping the double bind; what is clear is that it is pre-
sent regardless of whether reform occurs or not.
Pride and Prejudice again provides us important insights. The
character of Elizabeth tells us a good deal about living within the
double bind. Elizabeth sees value in the social rituals and proprie-
ties that constitute the social space that she occupies. Unlike her
mother, however, she is not captured by the role she plays within
her family and social situation. She is capable of reflection and de-
tachment that allow her to remain true to herself when that truth is
in conflict with her assigned role.43 Her refusal to act as a grateful
female when Mr. Darcy frames his first marriage proposal to her
in terms of his superior social position is but one example of the
complex character that Jane Austen has created.44 Elizabeth's em-
bodiment of the contradictions and tensions between the individual
and community encourages us to abandon abstractions that might
lead us either to mindless commitment to social convention or to
its disavowal. To find happiness and peace within the contradic-
tions and tensions is Elizabeth's lesson. Through the details of the
survey, all of us can take a better measure of the implications to
committed couples and to society of having surviving committed
partners take as heirs.
42 See Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian & Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our
Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 Law & Sexuality 63, 78 (1991) (juxtaposing
"widespread legalistic and feminist criticisms of marriage as an institution with the fact
of lesbian and gay momentum toward inclusion in the institution").
43 The discussion in the text extends Tony Tanner's discussion of social roles and self-
reflection. See Tony Tanner, Introduction to Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice 27-31
Tony Tanner ed., Penguin Books 1972) (1813).
See Austen, supra note 43, at 220-24.
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II. METHOD AND DESIGN45
The survey data were collected in the fall of 1996 by the Min-
nesota Center for Survey Research. They consisted of a telephone
survey of a sample of the general public and three samples of per-
sons in unmarried committed relationships: persons with opposite-
sex committed partners, women with same-sex partners, and men
with same-sex partners. The general public sample was randomly
generated from persons over the age of 25 residing in Minnesota.
Generating the sample of persons with opposite-sex committed
partners required the thoughtful creativeness of the Center. Taking
notice that most people know persons in opposite-sex committed
relationships, the Center generated the sample by asking respon-
dents in the general public sample to provide the name and phone
number of someone they knew in an opposite-sex committed rela-
tionship. We also faced difficulties in generating samples of same-
sex couples. We solicited volunteers through flyers and with the
assistance of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender advocacy
groups throughout the state.
All of the respondents were presented a series of scenarios in
which they were asked to divide the property of the decedent
among survivors identified by their familial-type relationship with
the decedent. All of the scenarios involved a committed partner-
ship that terminated as a result of the death of a partner. For re-
spondents in same or opposite-sex committed relationships, addi-
tional information was gathered regarding their personal
relationships, wealth accumulation, and children.
III. FINDINGS
There are three major findings of the study. First, a substantial
majority of the respondents in each sample group consistently pre-
ferred the partner to take a share of the decedent's estate. Respon-
dents with same-sex partners, however, were consistently more
generous to partners than were respondents from the general pub-
lic sample or the respondents with opposite-sex partners. This
finding is demonstrated by looking at the responses for a scenario
45 For a more complete discussion of the survey's method and design, see Mary
Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 Law
& Ineq. 1, 31-35 (1998).
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that asked the respondents how they would divide the estate
among a decedent's committed partner and decedent's parents.
The interviewers presented to respondents Scenario A:
In the first situation, neither the person nor their
opposite-sex partner has any children. We are inter-
ested in how you would divide the estate among the
survivors. If when the person dies only their own
parents and their partner are living, what percentage
of the estate would you give to their own parents?
What percentage would you give to the partner of
the person who dies? 46
A few preliminary remarks about the presentation of the find-
ings in the tables are necessary. Distributive preferences for the
scenarios followed easily identifiable patterns. The tables present
the results utilizing those patterns, combining the responses of
women and men in same-sex relationships since minimal differ-
ences were found in the two groups' distributive preferences.
Table 1. Distribution Patterns for Scenario A: Decedent Survived by Partner and
Parents
General Public Respondents Respondents
Sample with Opposite- with Same-Sex
Sex Partners Partners
Percent Distribution to:
Partner Parents (%) (%) (%)
100 0 14.0 30.3 64.7
51-99 1-49 8.1 6.1 24.1
50 50 45.3 42.4 10.5
1-49 51-99 4.7 3.0 0.8
0 100 27.9 18.2 0.0
Total Number of Respondents 86 33 133
46 Although unintentionally grammatically incorrect, the form of the question avoided
identifying the gender of the decedent. The grammatical error was made in every sce-
nario presented to respondents.
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Under prevailing law, the parents would receive the decedent's
entire estate and the partner would receive nothing.47 As the table
shows, nearly three-quarters of the respondents from the general
public sample, 48 over four-fifths of the respondents with opposite-
sex partners, and all of the respondents with same-sex partners
gave some share of the estate to the surviving partner. In the gen-
eral public sample, a somewhat greater percentage of the respon-
dents gave half or less of the estate to the partner than gave half or
more. Of the respondents with opposite-sex partners, over three-
quarters gave the surviving partner half or more and nearly all the
respondents with same-sex partners gave the surviving partner half
or more. The most prevalent distribution of the respondents with
same-sex partners was to give the partner the entire estate (64.7
percent).
How do these findings compare to public attitudes about the
appropriate treatment of legal spouses? The trend in inheritance
laws is to give the surviving spouse all or nearly all of the dece-
dent's property. 49 This trend corresponds to the public attitudes
found in the 1978 study. 50 In that telephone survey of the general
47 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
48 The margin of error is +/-9.8 percent (95 percent confidence interval). This margin
of error reflects the small sample size as well as the tendency of the responses to be po-
larized. Statistical significance is not reported for respondents with opposite-sex partners
or respondents with same-sex partners because the two sample groups were not gener-
ated randomly. Therefore the results should not be used to make statistical inferences
about populations.
49 Under the 1990 UPC, the spouse receives the first $200,000 plus three-fourths of
any balance of the intestate estate, and the parents receive one-fourth of that part of the
intestate estate that exceeds $200,000. See Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-102(2), 2-103(2)
(amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 81, 83 (1998). Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana,
and North Dakota have followed the UPC recommendation. See Alaska Stat. §§
13.12.102, 13.12.103 (Michie 1996); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-11-102, 15-11-103 (1999);
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 560:2-102, 560:2-103 (Michie 1999); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 700.2102 (West Supp. 2000); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 72-2-112, 72-2-113 (1999); N.D.
Cent. Code. §§ 30.1-04-02, 30.1-04-03 (1996). States that have otherwise enacted the
1990 UPC's general pattern of intestacy-Arizona, Minnesota, New Mexico, South Da-
kota, and West Virginia-provide that the surviving spouse inherits the entire estate
when the decedent dies without surviving children but with a surviving parent or parents.
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-2102 (West 1995); Minn. Stat. § 524.2-102 (West Supp.
2000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-102 (Michie 1995); S.D. Codified Laws § 29A-2-102
(Michie 1997); W. Va. Code Ann. § 42-1-3 (Michie 1997).
0 See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 Am. B. Found. Res. J.
319, 351 (1978). It also corresponds to the public attitudes found in a number of other
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public in which married respondents were asked hypothetically to
distribute their estates between their spouses and mothers, over 70
percent gave their entire estate to their spouses. 51 The share of the
estate given to the committed partner by the respondents in the
general public sample in the current study varied substantially
from the share of the estate given to the legal spouses by respon-
dents in the 1978 study. The proportion of respondents with oppo-
site-sex partners who gave the partner all of the estate also was
substantially less than the proportion of the married respondents in
the 1978 study that gave the legal spouse the entire estate. In con-
trast, the proportion of the respondents with same-sex partners
who gave the partner the entire estate (64.7 percent) is similar to
the proportion of married respondents who gave the legal spouse
the entire estate in the 1978 study (70.8 percent).
Further evidence of the likely intent of the respondents with
same-sex partners is found in their reporting of their current estate
plans. Over 58 percent of respondents who had parents surviving
but not children and who had wills or life insurance designated
their partners as their sole beneficiary in their wills or life insur-
ance policies. 52
empirical studies. See Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the
United States and England, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1303, 1308-09 (1969) (studying the records
of decedent estate administration in Washtenaw County, Michigan, and finding that 9 of
13 wills in the sample provided that the spouse receive the entire estate); Allison
Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 241, 253 (1963) (studying probate proceedings initiated in Cook County,
Illinois in 1953 and in 1957, and finding only six cases where there was a surviving
spouse but no children; in all but one of these cases the testator gave the surviving
s ouse all of the property).
See Fellows et al., supra note 50, at 351.
52 There were too few respondents with opposite-sex partners who had wills or life
insurance to draw any conclusions based on their current estate plans.
A substantial number of the respondents with same-sex partners named their part-
ners as beneficiaries in their wills and life insurance policies, even if they did not name
their partner sole beneficiary. After respondents were asked if they had a will or life in-
surance, they were asked about who was named as a beneficiary. A list of potential tak-
ers that included partner and parents was read. Over 90 percent of the respondents with
same-sex partners who had parents surviving but no children and who had wills or life
insurance designated their partner as a beneficiary but not necessarily the sole benefici-
ary. Data were not collected on the proportion of the estate or proceeds that the partner
would receive under the respondent's estate plan.
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Because we did not randomly draw the sample of respondents
with same-sex partners, we are unable to assess whether the sub-
stantial differences in distributive preferences they show reflect
actual differences between persons with same-sex partners and the
other populations or whether the differences presented here are
due to biases in this particular sample. The sample of respondents
with same-sex partners differed from the other samples on several
demographic dimensions, including level of income and educa-
tion, likelihood of not being religious, and likelihood of living in
the Twin Cities. Although we have no way to determine conclu-
sively whether these factors account for the differences between
samples in distributional preferences, some statistical evidence ex-
ists to support the claim that the differences in distributional pref-
erences are not due to these demographic factors.53
Some of the differences between respondents with same-sex
partners and those with opposite-sex partners may be explained by
the fact that legal marriage is an option for opposite-sex couples. 54
Opposite-sex couples who may have similar preferences to same-
53 In a series of analyses of the distributional preferences of the general public, re-
spondents were compared by educational level, income level, residence in the Metro
area, and religiosity. Educational level was categorized by three groups representing
those who had not attended college, those who had some college, and those who com-
pleted college or a higher degree. Distributional preferences were compared using
bivariate contingency table analysis. We measured the association of these variables with
gamma (y), and considered y> .3 as indicating a meaningful relationship. Gamma ranges
from -1.0 to + 1.0 with 0 indicating no relationship.
Educational level was not found to be related to distributional preferences for Sce-
nario A. Income, measured in three groups (0-$20,000, $20,000-$35,000, and over
$35,000 per year), was also unrelated to the distributional preferences for Scenario A.
Similarly, residence in the Metro area was not associated with the distributional prefer-
ences for Scenario A. Non-religiousness was associated with giving the partner a smaller
share of the estate in Scenarios A and B (see infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text)
tA: = -.36; B: y = -.35).
4 But see Ronald R. Rindfuss & Audrey VandenHeuvel, Cohabitation: A Precursor to
Marriage or an Alternative to Being Single?, 16 Population & Dev. Rev. 703, 704 (1990)
(questioning the assumption in much of the literature that cohabitation is either an alter-
native form of marriage or as the final state in a relationship that leads to marriage).
Rindfuss and VandenHeuvel posit that cohabitation by opposite-sex couples might be
better understood if it were associated with singlehood rather than marriage. See id. at
707. They present data supporting the proposition that attributes of those cohabiting are
more similar to persons who are single than persons who are married. See id. The au-
thors, however, recognize a substantial diversity among opposite-sex cohabiting couples
and agree that for those who have cohabited a substantial amount of time, understanding
the relationship as an alternative to marriage may be accurate. See id. at 704.
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sex couples may be excluded from the comparison because they
have married. Furthermore, for those who are unmarried, the na-
ture of the commitment is influenced by the opportunity to gain
legal recognition through marriage. Another possible explanation
for the differences is that respondents with same-sex partners may
have been more concerned that partners not be treated unfavorably
as compared to legal spouses in response to systemic discrimina-
tion.
Based on the differences in distributive preferences expressed
by the two groups in this study, it might be argued that donative
intent would be furthered if the share passing to a same-sex com-
mitted partner was greater than the share passing to an opposite-
sex partner. But that brings me to the second major finding of the
study. The respondents in each sample group consistently pre-
ferred same-sex and opposite-sex committed couples to be treated
the same under the inheritance laws. All the scenarios described
the decedent and surviving partner as being of the opposite sex.
For Scenario A, having to do with the partner and parents as sur-
vivors, however, the interviewers repeated the scenario describing
the decedent and decedent's partner as being of the same sex. For
all the remaining scenarios, respondents were asked if the way in
which they had distributed the decedent's estate would differ if the
partner had been of the same sex as the decedent. For each sce-
nario, the overwhelming majority in each sample did not change
their distributive choices. 55
55 For Scenario A, of the respondents in the general public, 85.5 percent (+/- 7.8 per-
cent) indicated no change in their distributive choices. The same was true for 97.0 per-
cent of the respondents with opposite-sex partners and 94.7 percent of the respondents
with same-sex partners. Of those respondents who gave a share of the estate to the sur-
viving partner, 80.0 percent (+/- 10.4 percent) of the respondents from the general public
sample, 100 percent of the respondents with opposite-sex partners, and 94.7 percent of
the respondents with same-sex partners, did not change their distributive choices when
the surviving partner was of the same sex as the decedent.
These findings may be subject to social desirability bias wherein respondents an-
swer questions so as to appear well-adjusted, unprejudiced, rational, or otherwise open-
minded. See Herman W. Smith, Strategies of Social Research 229 (2d ed. 1981). In Sce-
nario A we repeated the experiment, altering it only to describe a same-sex couple, and
asked the respondents to distribute the decedent's estate. In the subsequent scenarios, we
asked a more simplified form of the question. For example, in Scenario B, in which the
decedent was survived by a partner and siblings, we asked: "Would you give more, less,
or the same amount to the partner if the partner was the same sex as the person who
dies?" Having asked the question about whether sexual orientation of the committed
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Another scenario presented to the respondents that will be of
particular importance in any serious consideration of law reform
had to do with a decedent survived by a partner and a child from a
prior relationship. The respondents' distributive preferences in this
scenario support the two major findings that a substantial majority
of the respondents in each sample group preferred the partner to
take a share of the decedent's estate and that respondents in each
sample group preferred same-sex and opposite-sex committed
couples to be treated the same. The interviewers presented the re-
spondents with Scenario B:
[T]he person has a child under 18 from a prior rela-
tionship and the opposite-sex partner has no chil-
dren. When the person dies, how would you divide
the estate between the person's child and their part-
ner? What percentage of the estate would you give
to the child of the person who dies? What percent-
age of the estate would you give to the partner of
the person who dies?
Under prevailing law, the decedent's child would receive the
entire estate and the committed partner would receive nothing. 56 A
minor child was chosen as the competing claimant to the partner
because we hypothesized this would be one of the likely situations
where the respondents might believe that decedents had an obliga-
tion to provide a substantial amount of their estates to their chil-
dren. As the table shows, respondents had a variety of distributive
preferences for this scenario.
partners mattered in assessing distributive preferences using two different approaches
and having yielded comparable results, we have some assurance that social desirability
bias is minimal.
56 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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Table 2. Distribution Patterns for Scenario B: Decedent Survived by Own Child
from a Prior Relationship and Partner
General Public Respondents Respondents
Sample with Opposite- with Same-Sex
Sex Partners Partners
Percent Distribution to:
Partner Parents (%) (%) (%)
100 0 4.7 0.0 12.2
51-99 1-49 2.3 3.0 9.9
50 50 38.4 42.4 57.3
1-49 51-99 17.4 24.2 14.5
0 100 37.2 30.3 6.1
Total Number of Respondents 86 33 131
The majority of respondents in each sample (62.8 percent of
the general public sample; 57 69.7 percent of the respondents with
opposite-sex partners; 93.9 percent of the respondents with same-
sex partners) gave the surviving partner some share of the estate.
Nearly 56 percent of the general public sample gave the surviving
partner a share that is half or less of the estate. Of the respondents
with opposite-sex partners, this pattern prevailed two-thirds of the
time. Of the respondents with same-sex partners, the majority di-
vided the estate evenly between the partner and the decedent's
child (57.3 percent); 22.1 percent gave the partner over half of the
estate; and 20.6 percent gave the partner under half. Although a
significant proportion of the respondents from the general public
sample (37.2 percent) and of the respondents with opposite-sex
partners (30.3 percent) preferred the child to inherit the entire es-
tate, the most predominant distribution among those respondents
who gave the partner some share was to share the estate equally
between the partner and the child. Among committed partners with
children (both opposite-sex and same-sex), 90 percent would give
the partner some share of the estate, but only 12 percent would
give the partner over half of the estate. A majority of this group
(58 percent) would share the decedent's estate equally between the
57 The margin of error is +/-10.4 percent.
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partner and the child.58
Although the data clearly support an heirship law that gives a
committed partner a share of the estate, it also reveals, once again,
that public attitudes toward a surviving committed partner are dif-
ferent from public attitudes toward a surviving legal spouse as
found in the 1978 study. 59
III. DEFINING COMMTI'ED PARTNERS
If an inheritance law includes committed partners as potential
heirs, as is suggested by the results of these two scenarios and the
results of other scenarios presented to the respondents,60 then the
law must provide a definition of who qualifies as a committed
partner. This issue brings me to the third major finding of the
study: committed relationships for purposes of an inheritance law
can be identified through easily observable attributes, and those
attributes are shown to be associated with a preference for having
a partner share in a decedent's estate.
In this study, we drew the samples based on a self-definition of
committed relationship. For the purpose of developing a statutory
definition of committed partner, we gathered information about
the respondents' committed relationships to assess whether com-
mon observable attributes could be used to identify committed
58 When the respondents were asked if they would distribute the estate differently if
the surviving partner were of the same sex as the decedent, the overwhelming majority in
each sample indicated that their distributive choices would stay the same. Of the respon-
dents in the general public, 85.7 percent (+/- 7.6 percent) indicated no change in their
distributive choices. The same was true for 97.0 percent of the respondents with oppo-
site-sex partners and 98.5 percent of the respondents with same-sex partners. Of those
respondents who gave a share of the estate to the surviving partner, 81.1 percent (+/-
10.8 percent) of the general public, 95.7 percent of respondents with opposite-sex part-
ners, and 99.2 percent of respondents with same-sex partners, indicated that they would
not change their distributive choices if the surviving partner were of the same sex as the
decedent.
59 In the 1978 study respondents were asked how they would share their estate be-
tween a spouse and a minor child from a prior relationship who was living with the for-
mer spouse. A substantial majority (89.1 percent) of the respondents gave the surviving
spouse half or more. See Fellows et al., supra note 50, at 366. In the 1978 study the child
from a prior marriage lived with the former spouse. It is uncertain whether respondents
assumed some level of estrangement between the child and the decedent.
60 See generally Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An
Empirical Study, 16 Law & Ineq. 1 (1998) (describing the results of the eight scenarios
as well as a variation on one of the eight scenarios).
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partners. We sought respondents' own meaning of commitment by
asking, "What is it about your relationship that makes you define it
as committed?" To elicit further responses, we asked, "Is there
anything else you would say?" These responses are displayed in
Table 3.
Table 3. Open-ended Responses to "What is it about your relationship that makes
you define it as committed?"
Respondents with Respondents with
Response Opposite-Sex Same-Sex Partners
Partners
(Percent giving the response)
Feel committed 33.3 44.0
Deeply in love 3.3 24.8
Stated commitment publicly/ 0.0 21.1
commitment ceremony
Living together 36.7 35.3
Monogamy over an "extended" period of time 26.7 45.1
Financial interdependence 30.0 37.6
Plan present lives together 3.3 29.3
Plan future lives together 6.7 33.1
Have or raise children together 6.7 11.3
Have mutual wills 0.0 4.5
Have mutual life insurance policies 6.7 6.8
Other 26.7 21.5
Total Number of Respondents 30 135
Because this approach predictably would elicit spontaneous re-
sponses highly salient to the respondents but not necessarily indi-
cating observable attributes, we created a set of questions asking
respondents whether an observable attribute applied to their rela-
tionships. The purpose of these questions was to assess the fre-
quency with which certain attributes, which could be incorporated
easily into a statute, occur among self-defined committed partners.
The responses to these questions are displayed in Table 4.
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Table 4. Distribution of Observable Attributes of Committed Relationships Among
Committed Partners
Respondents with Respondents with
Observable Attribute Opposite-Sex Same-Sex Partners
Partners
(Percent responding "yes")
Commitment ceremony 6.7 26.7
Exchange a symbol (ring or other jewelry) 30.0 64.4
Arranged to be buried next to each other 6.7 5.9
Registration of Partner 0.0 21.5
-where possible 0.0 36.3
Joint charitable gifts 43.3 76.3
Joint bank accounts 36.7 71.1
Joint investment 6.7 37.8
Joint ownership of car or motor vehicle 20.0 42.2
Joint ownership of home 20.0 63.0
-- of home owners 35.3 73.3
Joint credit cards 20.0 46.7
Joint ownership of pet 43.3 74.1
Joint debt (other than home) 13.3 20.0
-of those with debt 28.6 37.0
Having reared or actively rearing child together 23.3 14.8
Partner is healthcare decision-maker 26.7 71.1
Partner is beneficiary of life insurance 33.3 69.6
-of those with life insurance 43.5 88.7
Total Number of Respondents 30 135
As Table 4 shows, the list of observable attributes captures many
of the themes suggested in the respondents' open-ended responses.
Within the context of heirship laws, for which donative intent
is a central issue, we analyzed the data to assess whether any of
these various observable indicators were associated with a prefer-
ence for having a committed partner inherit. We compared a re-
spondent's distributive preferences under the scenarios with the
observable attributes that were applicable to the respondent's
committed relationship. We were able to identify indicators that
were each positively associated with a preference for having the
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partner receive a larger share of the decedent's estate than if that
indicator did not apply to the respondent's relationship. 61
The overall pattern of findings, however, indicates consider-
able differences between the respondents with same-sex commit-
ted partners and the respondents with opposite-sex partners. The
disparities pertain both to the prevalence of the relationship indica-
tors examined and the capacity of the indicators to predict the re-
61 The relationships between the respondents' distributive preferences and the pres-
ence of each indicator were examined using bivariate contingency table analysis. For
Scenario A, the following indicators were each positively associated with a preference
for a respondent with a same-sex partner for having the partner receive a larger share of
the decedent's estate than if that indicator did not apply to the respondent's relationship:
exchanging a symbol of the relationship, such as a ring or other jewelry; registering the
relationship with a municipality; sharing ownership of a car; sharing ownership of a pet;
shared debt; naming a partner as a beneficiary of life insurance; and naming a partner as
health care decision-maker. Similarly, having been in the relationship for at least five
years was positively associated with a preference for having the partner receive a greater
share of the decedent's estate. Each indicator has the following gamma: exchanged sym-
bol of relationship (y = .34); registered committed relationship (y = .31); shared owner-
ship of a motor vehicle (y = .53); shared ownership of a pet (y = .35); shared debt (y =
.48); named partner a beneficiary of life insurance (y = .38); named partner healthcare
decision-maker (y = .31); length of relationship (y = .31).
For Scenario A, the following indicators were each positively associated with a
preference for a respondent with an opposite-sex partner for having the partner receive a
larger share of the decedent's estate than if that indicator did not apply to the respon-
dent's relationship: exchanging a symbol of the relationship, such as a ring or other jew-
elry; making joint charitable gifts; owning a joint bank account; naming a partner as
beneficiary of life insurance; and naming a partner as health care decision-maker. Shar-
ing ownership of a pet was also moderately associated with a preference for having the
partner receive a greater share of the decedent's estate. Both having been in the relation-
ship for at least five years and having cohabited for at least five years were each strongly
related to a preference for having the partner receive a greater share of the decedent's
estate. Because there were too few cases to consider several of these indicators alone in
the sample of respondents with opposite-sex partners, additional analysis was conducted
based on common themes. Having at least one of the symbolic indicators was highly as-
sociated with a preference for having the partner receive a greater share of the decedent's
estate. The same was true for having at least one of the indicators representing present
and future planning and for having at least one of the indicators representing financial
interdependence. Having at least one of the death-time arrangements was highly associ-
ated with a preference for having the partner receive a greater share of the estate, as was
having at least one of the indicators pertaining to life insurance and joint ownership.
Each indicator has the following gamma: exchanged symbol of the relationship 0' =.85);
made joint charitable gifts (-y = .61); owned joint bank accounts (y = .57); named partner
beneficiary of life insurance (y = .63); named partner health care decision-maker (y =
.62); shared ownership of a pet (y = .33); length of relationship (y = .52); length of co-
habitation (y = .69); symbolic indicators (y = .79); life planning indicators (y = .55); fi-
nancial interdependence indicators (y = .66); death-time planning indicators (y = .70);
life insurance or joint ownership ( = .68).
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spondents' distributive preferences regarding the committed part-
ner. As I indicated earlier regarding differences in distributive
preferences, we can only speculate as to possible explanations for
the differences. 62 The dissimilarities that were revealed regarding
indicators of a committed relationship raise questions about what
and how we should use the indicators for identifying a committed
relationship. They also underscore the need for further research to
assess whether same-sex committed relationships can or should be
treated the same as opposite-sex committed relationships under
heirship laws.
Relying on the indicators specified in this study and those that
may be generated by future studies enhances the likelihood that
meaningful characteristics of committed relationships are used.
The indicators developed in this study are based on the respon-
dents' self-defining characteristics as well as our research group's
preconceived characteristics of a committed relationship. The
combination of methods means that the identified indicators reflect
the lived experiences of opposite-sex and same-sex partners and
not just characteristics that researchers have superimposed on
committed relationships. This technique provides a partial re-
sponse to the concerns that are likely to arise concerning assimila-
tion and using marriage as the standard for determining commit-
ment. I want to be cautious, however, not to overstate the benefit
of relying on empirical studies for this purpose. Reporting of find-
ings inevitably emphasizes predominating responses and obscures
outlying ones with the result that the latter have little influence in
developing the factors for defining committed relationships. Be-
cause synthesis of empirical results tends to prefer similarities and
to explain away deviations from prevailing patterns, we need to be
careful about how we use the results.
The Hawaii approach, relying exclusively on self-
identification, avoids having to develop defining characteristics of
a committed relationship. 63 It has the further advantage of keeping
the state from invading the privacy of committed couples in the
process of determining whether sufficient evidence exists to con-
clude that a claimant was a committed partner of a decedent. It
62 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
63 See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 572C-4-5 (Michie 1997).
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does so, however, at the cost of leaving those, who for whatever
reason fail to sign a declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relation-
ship, unprotected by an heirship statute. One response might be to
adopt a dual system in which a state adopts a registration system
but also provides inheritance rights to a claimant who can other-
wise show that a committed relationship existed between the
claimant and the decedent. Although a dual system may seem to
embrace the advantages of both systems, it also may perpetuate
the disadvantages of each. Further study is necessary to assess
how a dual system might operate.
CONCLUSION
I started this Article by describing how Austen worked in an
atmosphere of family connections. I went on to describe how con-
nectedness reflected itself in my own work through collaboration.
This empirical study, representing my most recent collaborative
effort, is itself a study of connectedness. The findings uncover re-
lationships and connections that otherwise go largely unrecog-
nized in law and by society. Our project looked at one type of state
regulation contributing to that invisibility-the heirship laws-and
explored the question of recognizing committed partners as heirs.
In some respects, a change in the heirship laws has only lim-
ited implications for other areas of inheritance law and other areas
of the law in general. In other respects, however, changing the
heirship laws to allow a committed partner to share in the dece-
dent's estate could potentially have substantial legal, social, and
political effects. Recognition within heirship laws has consistently
had the effect of shaping, as well as reflecting, societal norms and
values and the definition of family itself.64 Gender equality would
be unthinkable within a legal system that embraced primogeniture.
Recognition of adopted children as heirs of an adopting parent's
ancestors and collateral relatives ultimately broke the stranglehold
64 Cf. Jane S. Schacter, "Counted Among the Blessed": One Court and the Constitu-
tion of Family, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1267, 1269-70 (1996). Although Professor Schacter ac-
knowledges the "perils" of establishing criteria based on traditional heterosexual families
within the context of second-parent adoptions, she recognizes that linking same-sex cou-
ples to traditional family rhetoric is necessary for "creating social and legal conditions
that can support an evolving array of diversely configured lesbian and gay-and other-
families." Id. at 1270.
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that blood ties had on the definition of family and even made it
possible for us to speculate on the possibility of including as an
heir a decedent's partner.
Allowing a committed partner to inherit under an heirship stat-
ute would not only have an effect on how others view family units
headed by committed partners, but it would likely have an effect
on how members of the family unit view themselves. Just as legal
invisibility currently shapes the internal dynamics of the family
unit, recognition inevitably will shape the relations of the partners
to themselves and to their children. Although the full extent of the
effect of this change on family units headed by committed partners
is difficult to know, what is easy to predict is that it will be pro-
found in different ways for opposite-sex and same-sex couples.
The uncertainty of the social and legal changes that would re-
sult from treating a committed partner as heir is matched by the
uncertainty with which the reader is left in Pride and Prejudice.
Darcy, the symbol in the novel for tradition and social conven-
tions, finds himself desiring and needing Elizabeth, the symbol in
the novel for nonconformity and independent thinking. We can
read the couple's marriage as the harmonious marriage of civility
and truth in the making of a more perfect society. 65 Austen, how-
ever, does not quite believe in that happy ending. At the conclu-
sion of the novel, while Elizabeth and Darcy are sharing a walk
and conversation after having committed themselves to each other
in marriage, Elizabeth is described as "longing" to make fun of
what Darcy was saying about himself and his friend Bingley, but
"she checked herself' because "[s]he remembered that he had yet
to learn to be laught at, and it was rather too early to begin. '66 This
moment in the novel raises difficult questions about Elizabeth and
Darcy's future. Will Elizabeth continually check herself, thereby
repressing the very nonconformity and independent thinking that
made her attractive to Darcy in the first place? Will Elizabeth's
admittance into Darcy's social group lead to Elizabeth conforming
her behavior and thinking so that the group's values and rituals
remain unchallenged? Will Darcy learn to laugh at himself even-
65 The discussion in the text extends Tony Tanner's discussion of the symbolic mean-
ing of Elizabeth and Darcy's marriage. See Tony Tanner, Introduction to Jane Austen,
Pride and Prejudice 41-42 (Tony Tanner ed., Penguin Books 1972) (1813).
66 Austen, supra note 65, at 380.
2000] 483
484 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 7:3
tually? Will the social group forever be changed by Elizabeth's
admittance so that it no longer places civilities ahead of truth?
There are no clear answers to these questions. What is clear is that
these questions are only possible to contemplate because Darcy
took the first steps of allowing himself to desire Elizabeth, of see-
ing himself as Elizabeth saw him, and of breaching the social
norms that kept the society in place by asking for her hand in mar-
riage. Austen's late eighteenth-century novel therefore raises one
last question relevant to the 21st century issue of whether we
should recognize committed partners as heirs: If Darcy could risk
changing who and what he was, why can't we?
